Admission Control Mechanisms for Continuous Queries in the Cloud
DocUID: 2010-004 Full Text:
PDF Author: Lory Al Moakar, Panos K. Chrysanthis, Christine Chung, Shenoda Guirguis, Alexandros Labrinidis, Panayiotis Neophytou, Kirk Pruhs
Abstract: Amazon, Google, and IBM now sell cloud computing services. We consider the setting of a for-profit business selling data stream monitoring/management services and we investigate auction-based mechanisms for admission control of continuous queries. When submitting a query, each user also submits a bid of how much she is willing to pay for that query to run. The admission control auction mechanism then determines which queries to admit, and how much to charge each user in a way that maximizes system revenue while being strategyproof and sybil immune, incentivizing users to use the system honestly. Specifically, we require that each user maximizes her payoff by bidding her true value of having her query run. We design several payment mechanisms and experimentally evaluate them. We describe the provable game theoretic characteristics of each mechanism alongside its performance with respect to maximizing profit and total user payoff.
Keywords: admission control, continuous queries, auction mechanisms
Published In: Proc. of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering
Place Published: Long Beach, CA, USA
Year Published: 2010
Project: UserCentric, AQSIOS, STREAMS Subject Area: Data Streams
Publication Type: Conference Paper
Sponsor: NSF IIS-0534531